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Abstract 
The barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a distressed bank 
under a bailout program of distressed loan purchases. In particular, the bank acts as if it has a single utility function 
that positively weights equity returns like, but negatively weights bankruptcy dislike. We show that an increase in the 
amount of distressed loan purchases decreases the loan amount at an increased margin when buying distressed loan 
amount is high. Bailout as such makes the bank less prone to loan risk taking, thereby contributing the stability of the 
banking system. A numerical exercise shows that the market-based estimates of the expected utility of bank equity 
returns which ignore the weights (a standard down-and-out call option) or the dislike (a standard call option) lead to 
significant overestimation. 
Keywords: barrier option, distressed asset purchases, bank interest margin, default risk 
1. Introduction 
The failed bank list displayed on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation website shows that between January 1, 
2008 and May 31, 2013, 473 banks have failed within the United States (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
2013). (Note 1) The government was reluctant to see bank failures end in a straightforward liquidation since bank 
termination incurs bankruptcy costs. The regulatory authority affiliated by the financial crisis launched bailout 
programs. However, 74 banks in the United States failed to repay the government and resulted in a loss (ProPublica, 
2013). (Note 2) The former failed bank list can be motivated based on a bankruptcy argument about financial 
stability, while the latter rescued banks can be motivated based on a profitability argument concerning bank behavior. 
The ongoing argument concerning the impact of government bailout on bank profits and risks warrants an 
assessment of the extent to which bailout affects the efficiency of bank intermediation in particular related to 
appropriate goal choices in modelling the bank’s optimization problem including equity like and failure dislike. 
Our objective is to make contributions to the literature as a result of the following expansion in methodology and 
scope. The original contingent claims approach to corporate security valuation views equity as a call option on the 
assets of the firm (Merton, 1974). This approach, assuming that the closure barrier is trivial, has found a natural 
application in banking intermediation (e.g., Ronn and Verma, 1986, and Episcopos, 2004). Later work has recognized 
that corporate securities should actually be viewed as path-dependent, barrier options (Merton, 1973, and Brockman 
and Turtle, 2003). Banking literature includes papers that use barrier options in some form to address the problem of 
early bank closure (e.g., Episcopos, 2008, and Lin et al., 2012). In regards to the method, we propose a framework 
for the utility function of the bank based on a weighted path-dependent, barrier option optimization algorithm instead 
of the commonly used nonweighted path-dependent approach. Banking is an ideal environment for the weighted 
barrier option utility model because the bank’s manager maximizes either his/her own expected utility or that of 
those who exercise control over the bank’s decisions of equity return like and bankruptcy dislike during a financial 
crisis. Bank claims are evaluated with weighted barrier options utility in the framework, providing a more suitable 
view of bank equity and debt. 
In regard to the scope, we focus on the bank interest margin decision, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the 
deposit rate, which is one of the principle elements of bank net cash flows and after-tax earnings (Lin et al., 2012). 
The spread is so important to bank profitability as well as to early bank closure problems (Cebula, 2010). Indeed, the 
bank interest margin is often used in the literature as a proxy for the efficiency of financial intermediation (Saunders 
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and Schumacher, 2000). The purpose of the paper is to follow this argument by providing a weighted barrier option 
model of bank behavior to the determination of bank interest margins under the government intervention program of 
distressed asset purchases. (Note 3) A direct implication of this model is that bank equity will be priced as an additive, 
weighted down-and-out call (WDOC ) option particularly reflecting its relative importance in the like of the bank’s 
higher equity return and the dislike of the bank’s early closure problem. 
The results of this paper show that when the buying distressed assets is large, an increase in the buying amount 
results in a decreased loan amount held by the bank at an increased margin, thereby contributing to the banking 
stability. Our numerical result is supported by Hoshi and Kashyap (2010): buying distressed assets is an appropriate 
way to recapitalize banks. But the bailout program lacks efficiency when the purchased amount remains low. If the 
dislike preference is ignored, the optimal bank interest margin is positively related to the amount of distressed loan 
purchases when loan volatility is high perhaps due to a financial turmoil. But if the like and dislike preferences 
weighted by default risks are not explicitly taken into account, the optimal bank interest margin is positively related 
to the amount of distressed loan purchases as well. If the WDOC  valuation is treated as a benchmark, bank equity 
returns which ignore the dislike of bankruptcy problem in the call option valuation or the default risk weighted in the 
barrier option lead to significant overestimation. Due to the alternative goals of the bank’s optimization problem for 
recapitalization and lending, our results should be of interest to banks, analysts and policy makers. 
In related work, Gorton and Huang (2004) claim that the benefits of government bailouts depend on the type of 
liquidity shock faced by banks. A liquidity shock is an event where banks suddenly need new resources. Gorton and 
Huang (2004) find that government bailout via asset purchases are feasible, when the number of assets to be sold is 
too large to be absorbed by private investors. In this case, the provision of liquidity by the government increases 
overall welfare. In addition, Bebchuk (2008) argues that asset purchases are suitable to cope with a financial turmoil, 
nevertheless the author proposes a redesign of the legislation in order to achieve the targets of the program, i.e., 
restoring stability in the banking system, while limiting costs to taxpayers. Our paper are silent on liquidity shock in 
Gorton and Huang (2004) and legislation redesign in Bebchuk (2008); however, may be viewed as complementary to 
these studies: purchases of distressed assets by the government are effective to stabilize banks when raising new 
capital in public markets is difficult. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic structure of the model. Section 3 derives 
the solution of the model and the comparative static analysis. Section 4 conducts a numerical analysis to explain the 
intuition of the comparative static results. The final section concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
The model is designed to capture in a minimalist fashion the characteristics of a bank: (i) the bank is in distress that 
distressed loans are risky in that they subject to non-performance (Wong, 1997), a liquidity shock is an event that the 
bank suddenly needs new resources (Gorton and Huang, 2004), and the bank is more likely to face the problem of 
early closure (Episcopos, 2008), (ii) the bank manager likes higher equity, but dislikes higher knock-out value, 
implying the expected value of a utility function defined in terms the weighted like and dislike, and (iii) the weighted 
behavior depends on the default risk in the bank’s equity returns. Note that (ii) and (iii) indicate that the utility 
function will have to incorporate three distinct functions: the equity of the bank is viewed as a call option on the 
bank’s assets (Merton, 1974), the knock-out value is viewed as a down-and-in call ( DIC ) option (Brockman and 
Turtle, 2003), and the default probability is the one that the bank’s assets will be less than the book value of the 
bank’s liabilities (Brockman and Turtle, 2003). As we discuss further below, the call captures the like, the DIC  
reveals the dislike, and the default probability demonstrates the weight-average factor of our model. 
Consider the bank that makes decisions in a single period horizon with two dates, 0 and 1, [0,1]t . At 0t  , the 
bank has the following balance sheet: 
(1 )L L B D K                                      (1) 
where 0L   is the amount of loans, (1 ) 0L   where 0 1   is the amount of non-purchased loans, 
0L   is the purchases of loans by the government, 0B   is the quantity of liquid assets, 0D   is the 
amount of deposits, and 0K   is the stock of equity capital. 
We assume that the bank is a loan rate setter and loan demand is a downward-sloping function of the loan rate LR , 
denoted by ( )LL R , / 0LL R   , and 2 2/ 0LL R    (Chen et al., 2014). 0B  indicates that the bank is a 
net lender of the Federal funds at 1t  . These assets earn the security-market interest rate of 0R . The bank 
accepts D  dollars of deposits. The bank provides depositors with a rate of return equal to the risk-free rate 
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0DR   (Chen et al., 2014). Equity capital held by the bank at 0t   is tied by regulation to be a fixed proportion 
q  of the bank’s deposits, K qD  where q  is the required capital-to-deposits ratio (VanHoose, 2007). 
The bank’s objective is to set LR  to maximize the expected value of a WDOC  option function, subject to Eq. (1). 
The market value of the bank’s underlying assets follows a geometric Brownian motion of the form: 
dV Vdt VdW                                    (2) 
and where (1 )(1 )LV R L    is the bank’s loan repayments, with an instantaneous drift  , and an 
instantaneous volatility  . A standard Wiener process is W . This explains that the bank’s aggregate asset portfolio 
value obeys the assumed stochastic process. We denote by Z  the book value of the net payments at 0t , that has 
maturity equal to 1t  . The value of the net payments at 1t   is specified as the payments to depositors 
(1 )DR D  net of the repayments from both the liquid-asset investment (1 )R B  and the purchases of loans by 
the government. This repayment from the asset purchases is assumed to be (1 )R L   since the government takes 
over the risk of illiquid loans at the price of R  (Klomp, 2013). (Note 4) Z  plays the role of the strike price of the 
standard call, since the market value of equity can be thought of as a call option on V  with 0t   to expiration 
equal to 1t  . The market value of equity ( SC ) will then be given by the Merton (1974) formula for call options: 
1 2( ) ( )S C V N d Z e N d
                                 (3) 
where 
(1 ) 1(1 ) [ ( 1) ] (1 )DR KZ R K L R L
q q
        
2
1
1 (ln )
2
Vd
Z
   , 2 1d d   , (1 ) DR R     
and where   is the discount rate due to the specification of Z , and ( )N   is the cumulative density function of 
the standard normal distribution. 
Next, our approach in specifying the DIC  option using Merton’s (1973) model is very similar to the one used by 
Brockman and Turtle (2003). The value of DIC  option is the difference between the SC  and the down-and-out 
call ( DOC ) option where the rebate upon failure is assumed to be zero. The DIC  formula represents bank 
bondholders (non-negative) claim and is given by 
2 2 2
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
H HD IC SC D O C V N b Ze N b
V V
                       (4) 
where 
,ZH   0 1  , 
2
1
2
   , )2(ln
1 22
1
  VZ
Hb ,  12 bb  
and where H  is the value of the bank’s assets that triggers bankruptcy (this is the barrier or knock-out value of the 
bank). For simplicity, we follow Brockman and Turtle (2003) and consider only the case of a constant barrier, 
H Z  where 0 1   is the barrier-to-debt ratio. The DIC  offers protection to bondholders by allowing 
them to “call in their chips” before asset values deteriorate further. 
Applying Hermalin (2005), we assume the objective function can be aggregated in such a way that positively 
weights SC  in Eq. (3), but negatively weights DIC  in Eq. (4). Assume further, as in Hermalin (2005), that the 
objective function of the bank is additively separable: 
1 2(1 ) (1 ) ( )S P S C P D IC                                (5) 
where )1( 1P  and )1( 2P  are the default probability weights on the two components of like and dislike, 
respectively. 
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (5) can be identified as the realized like discounted by the default risk in 
the bank’s equity returns with the SC  valuation, while the second term can be identified as the realized dislike 
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discounted by the default risk in the bank’s knock-out value with the DIC  valuation. Our approach in calculating 
the default probability 1P  using information about Eq. (3) is outlined in Vassalou and Xing (2004). The default 
probability in the SC  valuation is the probability that V  will be less than Z . In this context, 1P  can be written 
as: 
1 3 3( ) 1 ( )P N d N d                                    (6) 
where 
2
3
1 ( l n )
2
Vd
Z
  
 
and where 3d  is defined as the distance to default. Default occurs when the ratio ofV  to Z  is less than 1, or its 
log is negative. 
Next, we apply Brockman and Turtle (2003) to calculate the default probability 2P  based on Eq. (4). We arrive the 
SC  ( DOC  where DIC  vanishes) value that captures the bank’s equity. Bankruptcy prediction is equivalent 
to the default probability in the DOC  valuation proposed by Brockman and Turtle (2003) since the path 
dependency is invariant to the SC  valuation. The valuation Eq. (4) implies a risk-neutral failure probability over 
the interval from [ 0 , 1]t   that we can write as: 
))(1()( 312 2 aNeaNP
a                                 (7) 
where 
2
1
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2
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2
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2
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The proposed conceptual framework of Eq. (5) can be expressed mathematically in the closed-form, WDOC  
value model. The primary feature distinguishing a DOC  from a SC  is the existence of a barrier which, when 
breached, causes the termination of the option (i.e., failure). Furthermore, the weighted-average factors are imposed 
on SC  and DIC  revealing the preference when the optimal decision is made. Our model may be viewed as 
complementary to the contingent claims literature. 
3. Equilibrium and Comparative Static Results 
The first-order condition for an optimum of Eq. (5) is: 
0)(])1([ 2211 


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We require that the second-order condition be satisfied, that is 2 2/ 0LS R   . The first term [ ]  on the right-hand 
ride of Eq. (8) can be interpreted as the marginal equity value of loan rate in the weighted SC  valuation, while the 
second term ( )  can be interpreted as the marginal barrier value of loan rate in the weighted DIC  valuation. The 
optimal bank interest margin is set by the bank where both the weighted marginal values are equal. 
Consider next the impact on the bank’s loan rate (and thus on the bank’s interest margin) from changes in distressed 
loan purchases. Implicit differentiation of Eq. (8) with respect to   yields: 
2
22
/
LL
L
R
S
R
SR






                                  (9) 
where 
2 2 2
1 1
1
2 2
2 2 2
2
[ (1 ) ]
[ ]
L L L L
L L L L
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P P D IC P D IC D ICD IC P
R R R R
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   
               
               
 
The sign of Eq. (9) is governed by its numerator since the second-order condition is limited to 2 2/ 0LS R   . In 
general, the added complexity of a weighted barrier-based option does not always lead to clear-cut results in the 
current form of Eq. (9). However, we can certainly speak of tendencies for reasonable parameter levels 
corresponding roughly to Eq. (9) with the bank’s equity value in the WDOC  valuation. The numerical examples 
provide intuition regarding problems at hand, for example, the comparative static results of Eq. (9). 
4. Numerical Exercises 
Unless otherwise indicated, the parameter values are 3.5%R  , 2.5%DR  , 9.0%q  , 0.2  , and 
2.0 . Let ( %, )LR L  change from (4.1, 300) to (4.7, 279) due to the conditions of / 0LL R    and 
2 2/ 0LL R   . The value of   is assumed to increase from 0.1 to 0.7 due to the condition of 0 1  . Note that 
(i) L DR R  demonstrates that the bank interest margin is used as a proxy for the efficiency of financial 
intermediation (Lin et al., 2012), (ii) RRL   indicates that there is asset substitution of the earning-asset portfolio 
(Kashyap et al., 2002), (iii) R  is sufficiently larger than DR  when the capital requirement constraint is binding 
(Wong, 1997), and (iv) 9.0%q   implies that the specification of capital adequacy requirement is consistent with 
the approach of the Basel (VanHoose, 2007). The numerical parameters presented above can be intuitively interpreted 
as being closely approaching a real state of a hypothetical bank. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the comparative static results in Eq. (9), first of all, we observe equity 
components of bank expected values including SC  in Eq. (3), DICSCDOC   where DIC  is defined as Eq. 
(4), and S  in Eq. (5). The two examples of 3.0  and 0.6 are limited to 7.01.0   in our numerical 
exercises, as mentioned earlier. The possible conditions of 3.0  and 0.6 and 2.0  are due to Brockman and 
Turtle (2003). (Note 5) The findings are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Equity components of bank expected value * 
 ( %, )LR L    (4.1, 300) (4.2, 299) (4.3, 297) (4.4, 294) (4.5, 290) (4.6, 285) (4.7, 279)
 ( 0.3)SC    
0.3 43.8699 43.9433 43.9305 43.8308 43.6433 43.3677 43.0036
0.6 33.7877 33.8525 33.8780 33.8641 33.8108 33.7186 33.5882
 ( 0.3)DOC    
0.3 38.1834 38.2458 38.2279 38.1293 37.9498 37.6894 37.3485
0.6 29.0627 29.1284 29.1613 29.1616 29.1297 29.0666 28.9736
 ( 0.3)S    
0.3 31.5081 31.6094 31.6610 31.6623 31.6135 31.5146 31.3666
0.6 26.4759 26.5682 26.6468 26.7117 26.7633 26.8025 26.8304
 ( 0.6)SC    
0.3 65.7234 65.7002 65.5023 65.1286 64.5782 63.8500 62.9433
0.6 43.9403 43.9407 43.8474 43.6600 43.3784 43.0026 42.5330
 ( 0.6)DOC    
0.3 60.5396 60.5069 60.3046 59.9319 59.3883 58.6733 57.7867
0.6 39.5869 39.5881 39.5011 39.3260 39.0629 38.7122 38.2750
 ( 0.6)S    
0.3 36.2921 36.3274 36.2792 36.1470 35.9306 35.6300 35.2455
0.6 26.5671 26.6148 26.6269 26.6036 26.5457 26.4544 26.3316
* Expected values of SC  in Eq. (3), DICSCDOC   where DIC  is defined as Eq. (4), and S  in Eq. (5) are 
computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated otherwise, %5.3R , 2.5%DR  , 9.0%q  , 
0.2  , and 0.2  . 
 
Several results are observed from Table 1. (i) The equity value in the SC  valuation is consistently larger than the 
equity value in the DOC  valuation, implying that the knock-out value of the bank (the DIC  call based on Eq. (4)) 
is positive in sign. Our finding is supported by the empirical evidence of Brockman and Turtle (2003). (ii) We show 
that the equity value in the DOC  valuation is consistently larger than the equity value in the WDOC  valuation in 
Eq. (5), implying that the effects of default risk on equity return in the SC  valuation and on knock-out value in the 
DIC  valuation are significant. The gap value between DOC  and WDOC  ( S  in Eq. (5)) indicates that the bank 
may have incentives to make decisions explicitly taking into account the like of equity and the dislike of knock-out 
value. (iii) It is interesting that, as volatility of the underlying asset increases, both the values in the SC  and DOC  
valuation are increased. But, asset volatility has an ambiguous effect on a WDOC  option, in general. The reason is 
that there are two weighted effects in play. Increased volatility means that the weighted barrier is more likely be 
breached (thus, canceling the option), but leads to higher expected weighted payoff if the weighted barrier is not 
breached. 
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Table 2. Values of S  and /LR    when 0.3 = * 
 ( %, )LR L    (4.1, 300) (4.2, 299) (4.3, 297) (4.4, 294) (4.5, 290) (4.6, 285) (4.7, 279)
 S
0.1 36.0057 36.1121 36.1469 36.1094 35.9992 35.8159 35.5599
0.2 33.6951 33.7989 33.8419 33.8234 33.7433 33.6015 33.3985
0.3 31.5081 31.6094 31.6610 31.6623 31.6135 31.5146 31.3666
0.4 29.5017 29.6005 29.6611 29.6832 29.6670 29.6129 29.5220
0.5 27.7704 27.8666 27.9365 27.9801 27.9979 27.9904 27.9589
0.6 26.4759 26.5682 26.6468 26.7117 26.7633 26.8025 26.8304
0.7 25.8778 25.9622 26.0447 26.1250 26.2034 26.2803 26.3563
 2 / LS R     
0.1→0.2 -0.0013 0.0041 0.0095 0.0151 0.0207 0.0265
0.2→0.3 -0.0012 0.0043 0.0099 0.0156 0.0215 0.0275
0.3→0.4 -0.0012 0.0045 0.0104 0.0163 0.0224 0.0286
0.4→0.5 -0.0014 0.0047 0.0108 0.0170 0.0233 0.0297
0.5→0.6 -0.0019 0.0043 0.0106 0.0170 0.0233 0.0297
0.6→0.7 -0.0039 0.0019 0.0077 0.0134 0.0188 0.0241
 2 2/ LS R   
0.1 - -1.7897 -1.8077 -1.8194 -1.8248 -1.8177 - 
0.2 - -1.5216 -1.5354 -1.5422 -1.5412 -1.5293 - 
0.3 - -1.2449 -1.2544 -1.2560 -1.2497 -1.2288 - 
0.4 - -0.9569 -0.9621 -0.9586 -0.9456 -0.9200 - 
0.5 - -0.6552 -0.6567 -0.6486 -0.6294 -0.6012 - 
0.6 - -0.3426 -0.3420 -0.3320 -0.3109 -0.2827 - 
0.7 - -0.0499 -0.0525 -0.0484 -0.0375 -0.0217 - 
 /LR   , ‰
0.1→0.2 - -0.0072 0.0225 0.0523 0.0825 0.1141 - 
0.2→0.3 - -0.0082 0.0279 0.0643 0.1014 0.1403 - 
0.3→0.4 - -0.0099 0.0360 0.0825 0.1306 0.1823 - 
0.4→0.5 - -0.0142 0.0486 0.1125 0.1796 0.2533 - 
0.5→0.6 - -0.0293 0.0660 0.1638 0.2695 0.3881 - 
0.6→0.7 - -0.1149 0.0561 0.2322 0.4303 0.6667 - 
* The value of equity in Eq. (5) is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated otherwise, 
3.5%R  , 2.5%DR  , 9.0%q  , 2.0 , and 0.2  . Shaded area in the first panel represents an 
approximate equity value with a corresponding optimal loan rate. 
In the first panel of Table 2, we have the result of 0S  . Note that shaded areas represent, for example, the 
approximate maximum equity value of 36.1469 with the corresponding optimal loan rate of 4.3%, and that of 31.6623 
with the corresponding optimal loan rate of 4.4%. Correspondingly, we have the results of 2 / 0LS R      
observed from the shaded areas in the second panel. 2 2/ 0LS R    presented in the third panel explains the 
validness of the second-order condition. Accordingly, we have the result of / 0LR     observed from the shaded 
areas in the last panel that the bank’s interest margin is increased as the amount of the distressed loan purchases 
increases. Intuitively, as the bank participates in the program of distressed loan purchases to decrease its distressed 
loans holding, it now provides an expected return to a less risk base. One way the bank may attempt to augment its total 
returns is by shifting its investments to the liquid-asset market and away from its loan portfolio. If loan demand is 
relatively rate-elastic, a less loan portfolio is possible at an increased margin. Government intervention as such makes 
the bank less prone to risk-taking, thereby contributing the stability of the banking system. We argue that buying 
distressed assets in the bailout program is an appropriate way to recapitalize banks, which is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Hoshi and Kashyap (2010). 
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Table 3. Values of /LR    at various levels of   in the S  valuation * 
 
  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 ( % )LS R  
0.1 36.1469 (4.3) 38.8459 (4.2) 41.3572 (4.2) 43.5960 (4.2)
0.2 33.8419 (4.3) 36.0030 (4.3) 38.0620 (4.2) 39.9248 (4.2)
0.3 31.6623 (4.4) 33.2801 (4.3) 34.8561 (4.2) 36.3274 (4.2)
0.4 29.6832 (4.4) 30.7207 (4.4) 31.7877 (4.2) 32.8445 (4.2)
0.5 27.9979 (4.5) 28.4280 (4.4) 28.9581 (4.3) 29.5530 (4.2)
0.6 26.8304 (4.7) 26.6286 (4.5) 26.5485 (4.4) 26.6269 (4.3)
 /LR   , ‰ 
0.1→0.2 0.0225 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0037
0.2→0.3 0.0279 0.0327 0.0031 0.0050
0.3→0.4 0.0825 0.0424 0.0052 0.0072
0.4→0.5 0.1125 0.0592 0.0093 0.0114
0.5→0.6 0.2695 0.1808 0.0918 0.0270
* The value in Eq. (5) is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated otherwise, 3.5%R  , 
2.5%DR  , 9.0%q  , 2.0 , and 0.2  . The qualitative results of 2 2/ LS R   in the cases of 4.0 , 0.5, 
and 0.6 are negative in sign that confirm their validness of the second-order condition. The computation of 4.0 , 
0.5, and 0.6 follows a similar one as in the case of 3.0  in Table 2. Note that ( %)LS R  represents the approximate 
equity value with a corresponding optimal loan rate in the WDOC valuation. 
Table 3 presents the following results. (i) An increase in the asset volatility increases the bank’s equity evaluated at the 
optimal loan rate when the amount of the distressed loan purchases is low, and has an indeterminate effect on the bank’s 
equity when the purchase amount is high observed from the upper panel of Table 3. With a government as the lender of 
last resort in particular when buying distressed assets remains low, there is an incentive for the bank to increase the 
credit risk profile in order to obtain a higher expected payoff for shareholders (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010). (ii) 
The higher the asset volatility, the lower likely bank interest margin becomes, which is consistent with the empirical 
findings of Williams (2007). (iii) When the distressed asset amount purchased is high, an increase in the amount of the 
distressed loan purchases increases the bank’s interest margin. Government intervention as such makes the bank less 
prone to risk-taking, which is consistent with Hoshi and Kashyap (2010). (iv) The positive impact on the bank’s 
interest margin from increases in the relatively large amount of the distressed loan purchases is less significant when 
bank loan variability becomes larger. 
Table 4. Values of /LR    at various levels of   in the SC  valuation * 
 
  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 ( % )LSC R  
0.1 51.3927 (4.2) 61.0103 (4.2) 70.8064 (4.1) 80.6523 (4.1)
0.2 47.6310 (4.2) 55.9795 (4.2) 64.5376 (4.2) 73.1684 (4.1)
0.3 43.9433 (4.2) 51.0066 (4.2) 58.3175 (4.2) 65.7234 (4.1)
0.4 40.3658 (4.2) 46.1213 (4.2) 52.1688 (4.2) 58.3379 (4.1)
0.5 36.9742 (4.3) 41.3776 (4.2) 46.1370 (4.2) 51.0503 (4.1)
0.6 33.8780 (4.3) 36.8834 (4.2) 40.3151 (4.2) 43.9407 (4.2)
 /LR   , ‰ 
0.1→0.2 -0.0060 0.0002 - - 
0.2→0.3 -0.0065 0.0005 0.0045 - 
0.3→0.4 -0.0072 0.0010 0.0055 - 
0.4→0.5 -0.0080 0.0021 0.0072 - 
0.5→0.6 0.0485 0.0041 0.0103 0.0210
* SC  based on Eq. (3) is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated otherwise, 3.5%R  , 
2.5%DR  , 9.0%q  , 2.0 , and 0.2  . SC ( %)LR  represents an approximate equity value with a 
corresponding optimal loan rate. 2 2/ 0LSC R    in the four cases ( 3.0 , 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6) confirms their 
validness of the second-order condition. The computation of 2 2 2/ ( / ) / ( / )L L LR SC R SC R           follows a 
similar one as in the case of the S  valuation in Table 2. 
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Alternatively, suppose that barrier is not in effect. The findings are summarized in Table 4. (i) For a given level of 
buying distressed loans, the equity return with a negatively corresponding optimal margin is positively related to loan 
volatility. This result is understood that there is an incentive for the bank to increase the risk profile in order to obtain a 
higher expected equity return at a given level of bailout (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010). (ii) For a given level of 
asset variability, the equity return with a positively corresponding optimal margin is negatively related to the bailout 
amount of buying distressed loans. This explains that the bailout program is costly to the distressed bank, which is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Hoshi and Kashyap (2010): the total amount of assets purchased remains low 
in the Troubled Asset Relief Program in the United States. (iii) We observe the results from the lower panel in Table 4 
and find 0/  LR  when loan volatility is high. Bailout as such makes the bank less prone loan risk taking at an 
increased margin, thereby contributing the stability in the banking system. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Hoshi and Kashyap (2010): buying distressed assets from banks is an appropriate way to recapitalize banks. Therefore, 
quantifying the role of the underlying asset volatility on bank contingent claims is important. 
Table 5. Values of /LR    at various levels of   in the DOC  valuation * 
 
  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 ( %)LDOC R   
0.1 45.2804 (4.2) 55.2252 (4.2) 65.1895 (4.1) 75.1173 (4.1) 
0.2 41.7136 (4.2) 50.3736 (4.2) 59.0874 (4.1) 67.7981 (4.1) 
0.3 38.2458 (4.2) 45.6032 (4.2) 53.0543 (4.1) 60.5396 (4.1) 
0.4 34.9248 (4.2) 40.9541 (4.2) 47.1248 (4.1) 53.3722 (4.1) 
0.5 31.8490 (4.3) 36.4982 (4.2) 41.3727 (4.2) 46.3512 (4.1) 
0.6 29.1616 (4.4) 32.3759 (4.2) 35.9079 (4.2) 39.5881 (4.2) 
 /LR   , ‰ 
0.1→0.2 0.0013 0.0050 - - 
0.2→0.3 0.0015 0.0063 - - 
0.3→0.4 0.0022 0.0079 - - 
0.4→0.5 0.0034 0.0100 - - 
0.5→0.6 0.0053 0.0143 0.0182 - 
* DICSCDOC   based on Eqs. (3) and (4) is computed using the following parameter values, unless indicated 
otherwise, 3.5%R  , 2.5%DR  , 9.0%q  , 2.0 , and 0.2  . DOC ( %)LR  represents an approximate 
equity value with a corresponding optimal loan rate. 2 2/ 0LDOC R    in the four cases ( 3.0 , 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6) 
confirms their validness of the second-order condition. The computation of 
2 2 2/ ( / ) / ( / )L L LR DOC R DOC R           follows a similar one as in the case of the S  valuation in Table 2. 
 
Next, suppose that the default risk weighted in the WDOC  option valuation is not in effect. Under this view, the 
comparative static results of  /LR  at various levels of asset volatility are summarized in Table 5. We show that 
an increase in the amount of buying distressed loans reduces the loan portfolio held by the bank at an increased margin. 
Basically, increases in the amount of distressed loan purchases encourage the bank to shift investments to the 
liquid-asset market, the bank increase the size of its spread in order to reduce the amount of loans. 
In the following subsection, we use the results presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 to compare the effects of distressed loan 
purchases on the bank’s volatility under the WDOC  with those under the SC  or the DOC . The results are as 
follows. (i) An increase in the loan volatility increases the bank’s equity return with a negatively corresponding optimal 
bank interest margin, except that the distressed loan purchases remain high in the WDOC  valuation. (ii) If the 
benchmark is treated as the WDOC  valuation, we find that market-based estimates of bank equity returns in the 
SC  and DOC  valuations lead to significant overestimations. (iii) The impact on bank interest margin from 
changes in buying distressed loans have a positive effect in the DOC  valuation, in the WDOC  valuation when 
purchasing amount remains large, and in the SC  valuation when loan volatility is high. Our results are consistent 
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with Santomero (1984) that the choice of an appropriate goal in modeling the bank’s optimization problem remains a 
controversial issue. These results based on different objectives may be also due to the conflicting goals of the program 
of distressed asset purchases for bank recapitalization and bank lending. 
5. Conclusions 
The paper proposes a barrier option utility approach for bank interest margin determination under distressed asset 
purchases by the government based on an application of the barrier option framework of Brockman and Turtle (2003). 
Specifically, the objective function includes the like of higher equity return based on the weighted standard call option 
and the dislike of higher knock-out value based on the weighted DIC  option. We show that the bailout program of 
distressed asset purchases is appropriate. One issue that has not been addressed is the optimal bank interest margin 
management under a design of rescue packages. For example, the Troubled Asset Relief Program is a combination of 
equity injections and distressed asset purchases, while most European bailout programs combine government 
guaranteed debt issuance programs with direct equity injections (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010). In particular, is it 
the case that the results of this paper also apply to rescue package alternatives. The aforementioned issue may provide 
a maple opportunity for future research. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Out of this figure, 140 of these banks failed in 2009, while 156 failed in 2010 (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2013). 
Note 2. These transactions are final and will never result in a profit for taxpayers (ProPublica, 2013). 
Note 3. Among the possible means of government intervention are government guaranteed debt issuance programs, 
direct equity injections, and purchases of distressed assets by the government. Our analysis is limited to the last one. 
Results to be derived from our model may not extend to the cases where the bank is bailed out by the debt insurance 
and equity injection programs (see Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2010). 
Note 4. Asset purchases may even provide capital relief, if purchases are higher than book values. However, the 
purchase of assets at prices below book value would instead imply a forced write-down and a fire sale for the 
recipient institution (Klomp, 2013). Our model focuses on the cost of risk mitigation at the price of the 
security-market interest rate since (1 )LR L   becomes a risk-free repayment with government bailout. 
Note 5. The average asset volatility is 0.2904 with a corresponding standard deviation of 0.2608, and the average 
barrier estimate by debt load ( 0.1 debt proportion 0.2  ) is 0.4151 with a corresponding standard deviation of 
0.1529 (Brockman and Turtle, 2003). 
